Abstract-Resilient monitoring systems (RMSs) are sensor networks that degrade gracefully under cyber-attacks on their sensors. The recently developed RMSs, while being effective in the attacked sensors identification and isolation, exhibited a drawback in their operation-an exponentially increasing assessment time as a function of the number of sensors in the network. To combat this curse of dimensionality, a decomposition approach has been proposed, which led to a dramatic reduction of the assessment time, irrespective of the sensor network dimensionality. However, information losses and, thus, reductions in the level of resiliency due to the decomposition, have not been investigated. This paper is intended to carry out such an investigation. Specifically, it derives conditions for lossless decomposition in terms of the Renyi-2 entropy. The development is based on the analysis of matrices, which characterize coupling of process variables and on a monotonicity property of the Dempster-Shafer combination rule on a class of functions, which arise within the RMS operation.
Garcia et al. [1] provided methods for RMS design and illustrated their application using a boiler/turbine system. These methods include the so-called centralized inference calculations (see Section III for a brief review), which are utilized to ascertain the status of the plant process variables (e.g., temperatures, pressures, flow rates, etc.). While the resulting RMS exhibited a high level of resiliency, it exposed a shortcoming of the approach developed-an excessively long assessment time due to slow convergence to the optimal sensor network state. Here, the term "network state" is understood as a vector of 1's and 0's, with 1 indicating that the corresponding sensor is taken into account for the plant condition assessment and 0 that it is not, while the term "optimal" is used to denote the state, which leads to the least uncertain (i.e., minimum entropy) plant condition assessment. Specifically, it has been shown that due to the above mentioned centralized inference calculations, the assessment time of the plant condition, T a , behaves as T a = κ2 N SN (1) where the pre-exponential factor, κ, depends on the assessment algorithms involved and N SN is the number of sensors in the network. This implies that even if κ is relatively small, say, κ = 1 s, T a is 17 min if N SN = 10 and 12 days if N SN = 20. Clearly, such a long assessment time may be unacceptable in most applications, and its reduction is a key problem of improving the RMS design of [1] .
An initial step in this direction has been taken in [2] , where, along with considering a relatively complex model of a power plant, the so-called decentralized inference calculations (see Section III for details), as a method for reducing T a , have been introduced. This method involves the decomposition of the sensor network into subnetworks, each monitoring a small subset of the plant process variables. In the sequel, we assume that each of these subnetworks monitors a single process variable, although the case of subnetworks monitoring a group of process variables can be considered similarly. Thus, if a plant has M process variables, the sensor network, SN, is decomposed into M subnetworks, SN 1 , . . . , SN M , leading to the assessment time in each subnetwork given by T a,i = κ i 2 N SN i (2) where N SN i is the number of sensors monitoring the process variable i. Therefore, even if the pre-exponential factor is somewhat increased (i.e., κ i > κ, ∀i), the assessment time 2168 -2267 c 2016 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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would decrease substantially if N SN i << N SN , ∀i. For instance, if N SN i ≤ 2, ∀i and κ i = 1.5 s, ∀i, the process variable assessment time is less than 6 s, irrespective of N SN . In other words, the assessment of each process variable could be carried out sufficiently rapidly, and the resulting information could be used for plant condition assessment practically instantaneously.
While the decentralized assessments of [2] were effective in reducing T a , an important issue remained open: Garcia et al. [2] did not provide any quantification of information losses due to the decentralization. The main focus of this paper is to generalize the method of [2] and, more importantly, provide sufficient conditions under which the decentralization leads to no information losses.
B. Approach
The centralized and decentralized assessments of [1] and [2] involve, in particular, the following two steps of calculations: 1) the total probability formula to obtain the inferences and 2) the Dempster-Shafer (D-S) rule [3] , to combine the assessments of individual process variables. It turns out that information losses may occur at each of these steps, where the term "information losses" refers to an increase of the entropy of the decentralized process variable assessment as compared with the centralized one. In this paper, we compare the centralized and the decentralized assessments, and determine conditions under which the above two steps lead to no loss of information.
The approach of this paper is as follows. The first of the above mentioned steps (the total probability formula) involves statistical models of coupling between the process variables, characterized by the conditional probability mass functions (pmfs) P[V i |V j ], where V i and V j , i = j, i, j = 1, . . . , M, are process variables. In this paper, we derive a sufficient condition on P[V i |V j ], which ensures that the entropy of the decentralized inferred assessment is the same as the optimal (in the sense of minimum entropy) centralized inferred assessment.
For the second step (the D-S rule), we show that under the above condition and a certain monotonicity property, the entropy of the centralized and the decentralized assessments is the same.
As far as the entropy is concerned, we use the Renyi-2 entropy [4] , rather than the Shannon entropy [5] , due to the fact that the former has the property of spherical symmetry in the probability space (which is required for the proofs), while the latter does not. Here, the term "spherical symmetry" refers to the property, wherein all pmfs having equal entropy lie on a sphere, centered at the uniform pmf, with the radius defined by the value of the entropy. Note also that the Renyi-2 entropy has been shown to be effective in a number of random signal processing problems [6] [7] [8] , which provides an additional motivation for using Renyi-2 entropy, rather than Shannon entropy.
C. Paper Outline
Section II introduces the model considered and formalizes the problem addressed. In Section III, the algorithms used in the centralized and the decentralized process variable assessments are outlined. Section IV provides a sufficient condition under which the decentralized inference calculations lead to no information losses as compared with the centralized ones. In Section V, a sufficient condition for lossless decentralization is derived. Finally, Section VI lists the conclusions and topics for future research. The proofs are included in Appendixes A-D.
II. MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider plant G with process variables V i , i = 1, . . . , M, each viewed as a random variable, V i , with the universal set
where N V i stands for normal and A V i ,l for an anomaly of type l (induced either by a physical attack or malfunction), and n i is the cardinality of V i . The coupling among the process variables is characterized by a set of conditional probabilities
More details and justification of this model are given in [1] and [2] .
The plant G is monitored by the sensor network SN comprised of N SN sensors, which could be either under a cyber-physical attack or malfunction. The SN can be viewed as a set of subnetworks, 
and each state x ∈ X can be viewed as the ordered concatenation of the states y i ∈ Y i , that is
Given this model, the centralized [1] and the decentralized [2] , assessments of process variables V i , i = 1, . . . , M, can be symbolically represented as follows:
Centralized:
Decentralized:
The notations involved in these expressions (see Section III for calculations involved) are as follows: 
The latter may lead to information losses, which is a drawback of decentralization.
2) The centralized system carries out the optimization in X, whereas the decentralized one in
The latter leads to a reduction of the process variable assessment time, which is the advantage of decentralization. The problems addressed in this paper are to derive sufficient conditions for lossless decomposition quantified as
where H 2 {·} is the Renyi-2 entropy, and to illustrate information losses when these conditions are not satisfied.
III. CENTRALIZED AND DECENTRALIZED PROCESS VARIABLE ASSESSMENT PROCEDURES
In this section, we briefly overview the centralized and decentralized process variable pmf assessment techniques developed in [1] and [2] , respectively.
A. Centralized Case [1] 1) Assessment ofp y i [V i ]:
If the state y i ∈ Y i has a single nonzero element, the evaluation ofp y i [V i ] is carried out based on the data reported by this sensor and its data quality (DQ). The DQ is a scalar taking values on [0, 1], with 1 indicating that the sensor is totally trustworthy and 0 not trustworthy at all. The DQ is evaluated based on an active data quality acquisition procedure, whereby probing signals are applied to the process variables, and the level of disagreement between the anticipated and the actual response of the sensor is used to quantify its DQ. The sensor's data and DQ are the inputs to the so-called h-procedure, the steady state of which provides the sought pmf
where S i is the random variable characterizing the sensor data;
, is its pmf (identified using the classical statistical methods); V i is the universal set of V i ; and
If y i has more than one nonzero element, for each of them the pmf is evaluated using (8) and then the D-S combination rule is used to combine these pmfs. For instance, if y i has two nonzero components, resulting inp
When y i has more than two nonzero components, say k > 2 nonzero components, the pmfp
2) Centralized Assessment of Inferred pmfp y j [V i ]:
is calculated using the total probability formulâ
where P[V i |V j ], i = j, is the process variable coupling mentioned in Section II.
3
4) Assessment of Optimal pmfp x
This assessment is carried out using the method of rational controllers developed in [9] . Rational controllers are dynamical systems, which operate in a decision space and possess two properties: 1) ergodicity and 2) rationality. The ergodicity implies that the controller visits each state in the decision space with a nonzero probability. The rationality implies that the residence time in states with a smaller penalty function is larger than in those with a larger one. It is shown in [9] that if the level of rationality (quantified by a positive integer) is large enough, the rational controller spends most of the time in states with the smallest penalty.
In the case under consideration, the decision space is X and the penalty in each state x ∈ X is the entropy ofp x [V i ]. A rational controller, operating in X, was introduced in [1] and shown to perform well in all cyber-physical attack scenarios considered. This controller is applied in this paper for the identification of the extremal set Q i ⊆ X, consisting of all points 
4) Assessment ofp
(y * 1 ,y * 2 ,...,y * M ) [V i ]: This is carried out using the pmfsp y * i [V i ] andp y * j [V i ], i = j, by applying the D-S combination rulê p (y * 1 ,y * 2 ,...,y * M ) [V i = σ ] = M j=1py * j [V i = σ ] σ ∈ V i M j=1py * j [V i = σ ] , σ ∈ V i , i = 1, . . . , M.(14)
C. Assessment Entropy
As mentioned above, the assessments ofp
. . , M, are based on selecting a pmf with the smallest entropy. In [1] and [2] , the Shannon entropy, defined by
has been used. It turns out, however, that the Renyi-2 entropy
is more appropriate for the problem at hand. The reasons are as follows: 1) As mentioned in Section I-B, the Renyi-2 entropy possesses the property of spherical symmetry, whereas the Shannon entropy does not. 2) The Renyi-2 entropy is more effective in quantifying the so-called "guesswork" [10] , which is the expected number of trials necessary to guess the outcome of a random variable and which is conceptually similar to the pmf assessments carried out in this paper. 3) Finally, the Renyi-2 entropy has been shown to be effective in several random signal processing problems [6] [7] [8] , somewhat similar to those addressed here. Therefore, in this paper we use the Renyi-2 entropy for botĥ
IV. CONDITION FOR LOSSLESS DECENTRALIZED INFERENCE ASSESSMENT
In this section, we provide a condition under which no loss of information takes place due to the decentralized inference calculation as compared with the centralized one.
Represent the conditional pmf P[V i |V j ], i = j, as a set of column-vectors
where n i is the cardinality of V i . Recall that the components of the p V i |V j 's belong to the interval [0, 1] and their sum is 1. We introduce the following assumption: Assumption 2:
1) The 2-norm of all the columns of matrix
2) The inner products of every pair of columns of matrix
While this assumption seems to be contrived, its information-theoretic implication is as follows:
Proof: See Appendix A.
Thus, Assumption 2 guarantees that the quality of induced pmfs remain the same, if the original pmfs are equally informative. This property leads to the following:
Theorem 1: Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the optimal decentralized inferred pmfp y * j [V i ], calculated according to (13) , has the same information as the most informative centralized inferred pmf, calculated according to (11) , that is
Proof: See Appendix B. Thus, this theorem provides a sufficient condition under which the decentralized inferred pmf (which requires the pmf evaluated at only y * j ∈ Y j ) does not lead to information losses as compared with the centralized inferred pmf assessments (which require the pmfs evaluation at all states y j ∈ Y j ).
Below, we illustrate the utilization of Theorem 1 and quantify information losses when Assumption 2 is not satisfied.
Example 1: Consider the RMS defined as follows.
1) The plant G: a) the plant is characterized by two process variables, V i , i = 1, 2, modeled as discrete random variables,
b) the coupling between the process variables is characterized by the following conditional pmfs: 
4) Information losses: a) case of δ = 0: using (8) and (9), and the scenario of Example 1, compute the pmfsp
As a result, we obtain p y 
, y 1 ∈ Y 1 , are computed using (11) and (13), respectively, and H 2 {·} is the Renyi-2 entropy (16); b) case of δ = 0: note that the pmfs (28) are independent of δ, and, therefore, remain the same, implying that Assumption 1 holds. Furthermore, note that when δ = 0, Assumption 2 is not satisfied. To evaluate if information losses take place and to which extent, introduce
and, using (11), (13) , and (28), evaluate L 2 as a function of δ. The result is shown in Fig. 1 . From this figure, we conclude the following: i) When δ ∈ [0, 0.34] and δ ∈ [0.7, 0.8], the value of L 2 is 0, implying that Assumption 2 is not a necessary condition for lossless decentralized inferences. 
Since D 2 {·||·} may be viewed as the "distance" between the two pmfs, the loss of resiliency can be quantified by
− min
This quantity can be calculated as a function of δ [involved in (24)]. The result is shown in Fig. 2 
An answer is given below.
As it is described in Section III, the calculation of
is based on the D-S combination rule (14)
. This rule is known to be, in general, nonmonotonic [12] in the sense that D-S combination of two pmfs, say,p 1 [V] andp 2 [V], may have a larger entropy than either of the constituent pmfs. This issue has been investigated in [13] , where it has been shown that this does not take place (i.e., the D-S combination rule is, in fact, monotonic) if the constituent pmfs are sufficiently "close" to each other. As it turns out, a condition for lossless decentralized process variable assessment depends on the monotonicity property of the D-S rule. Specifically, consider the pmfsp y j [V i ], i, j = 1, . . . , M, calculated using the technique of Section III, and introduce:
Assumption 3: The D-S combination rule is monotonic on the set of pmfs
then
The meaning of this assumption can be delineated as follows:
Lemma 2: Under Assumption 3,
Proof: See Appendix C. Lemma 2, therefore, states that under Assumption 3, the D-S combination leads to a pmf, the entropy of which is no larger than that of each of the constituent pmfs.
Based on the above, we derive the following condition under which the decentralized process variable assessment is lossless.
Theorem 2: Under Assumptions 1-3,
Proof: See Appendix D. An application of Theorem 2 and quantification of information losses when Assumption 3 is not met are illustrated by the following:
Example 2: In this example, the plant G remains the same as in Example 1 (with δ = 0, so that Assumption 2 is met), but the SN and the attack scenario are different.
1) The sensor network SN and attack scenario: a) each process variable is monitored by one sensor, S i , i = 1, 2; b) the sensor monitoring V 1 operates normally, with its data quality being DQ 1 = 1 and its pmf being the same as in (25); c) the sensor monitoring V 2 may be under attack, with its data quality being DQ 2 = 1 − δ 1 , 0 ≤ δ 1 ≤ 1 (the parameter δ 1 is used below to quantify the effect of Assumption 3), and its pmf being the same as in (27).
2) Information losses: a) case of δ 1 = 0: as before, the pmfsp
Clearly, Assumption 1 is satisfied. Next, using (11) and (37), compute the inferred pmfŝ
Based on the above pmfsp
it can be verified that Assumption 3 is satisfied. Thus, as it follows from Theorem 2, the loss of information due to the decentralized process variable assessments is 0, that is
are the decentralized and the centralized optimal pmfs of V 2 , computed as in Section III. Note that when δ 1 = 1, Assumption 3 is also met, and, therefore, in this case the information losses are 0; b) case of 0 < δ 1 < 1: while the pmfsp y
[V 2 ] are independent of δ 1 [and, therefore, remain the same as in (37)], the pmf p y
] is a function of δ 1 , and can be expressed asp
Note that the inferred pmfsp y 1 [V 2 ], y 1 ∈ Y 1 , are also independent of δ 1 and are the same as in (38). Based on the above pmfsp y i [V 2 ], y i ∈ Y i , i = 1, 2, it can be verified that Assumption 3 is not satisfied. To quantify the information losses due to the decentralization, introduce
and investigate its behavior as a function of δ 1 (see Fig. 3 ). Based on this investigation, the following may be observed: i) Since L 2 is 0 at δ 1 = 0 and δ 1 = 1, and since L 2 is a continuous function of δ 1 , the value of L 2 varies nonmonotonically in δ 1 ∈ (0, 1). ii) The largest value of L 2 is less than 0.18, implying that the information losses are less than 18%. 3) Losses in Resiliency: As before, introduce
(42) and evaluate its behavior as a function of δ 1 . The result is shown in Fig. 4 , from which we conclude the following: a) As in the case of information losses, the value of LR 2 is 0 at δ 1 = 0 and δ 1 = 1. This is due to the fact that as δ 1 approaches either 0 or 1, the decentralized and the centralized optimal pmfs are either the same or are close to each other. b) LR 2 is not a continuous function of δ 1 , as can be observed from the discontinuities at δ 1 = 0. 
Furthermore, let the pmfp y j [V j ], y j ∈ Y j , be represented as the column vector q y j ,V j ∈ R n j , that iŝ
where 0 ≤ q
is computed using the total probability formula, that iŝ
and can be similarly represented as the column vector
As assumed in Assumption 2, the 2-norms of the columns of P[V i |V j ], i = j, are equal. Let the value of these 2-norms be denoted as
where the p V i |V j 's are the columns of P[V i |V j ], i = j, introduced in (17). Similarly, as assumed in Assumption 2, the angles between each pair of columns of P[V i |V j ], i = j, are equal. Let the value of these angles be denoted as
where
Introduce the following lemma, which is used in the proof of Lemma 1:
Lemma 3: Under Assumption 2,
Proof: Expression (A.3) can be rewritten as
Using the above equation, compute
Substitute (A.5) and (A.6) in the right hand side of (A.9) to obtain
Taking the square on both sides of this expression, we get
Thus, 2q
, y j ∈ Y j . Substituting this expression into the right hand side of (A.10), we obtain (A.7).
Proof of Lemma 1: As assumed in the statement of this lemma,
where, as before, where, as before, the equality is attained at y j = y * j , j = i. 
